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The Regime of Warships Under the
United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea
BERNARD H. OXMAN*
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("Con-
vention"Y) adopted in 1982 is the result of negotiations that began
with diplomatic communications between the Soviet Union and
the United States and other States in 1966 and 1967. The purpose
of these communications was to ascertain whether a basis could be
found for convening a new conference on the law of the sea to fix
the maximum permissible breadth of the territorial sea at twelve
nautical miles, without prejudice to continued maritime mobility
through international straits.
This underlying purpose was different from that of Ambassador
Pardo of Malta in his 1967 speech in the U.N. General Assembly
calling for the establishment of an international regime for the sea-
beds beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction. There was
a shared concern for the effects of the rapidly increasing extensions
of coastal State jurisdiction out to sea. But the objective of the
maritime powers engaged in conversation by the Soviet Union was,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author served as representa-
tive of the United States to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vice-Chair-
man of the U.S. Delegation, and Vice-Chairman of the English Language Group of the
Drafting Committee of the Conference. The views expressed are entirely his owm This is an
English adaptation of an article originally published in 28 Annuare francais de droit inter-
national 811 (1982). The author is grateful to Professor Horace B. Robertson, Jr. for his
comments on the draft of this article.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dem 10, 1982,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 LL.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
2. 22 U.N. GAOR Annex 3 (Agenda Item 92) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
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unlike Ambassador Pardo's, in a literal sense, conservative:
preventing the erosion of the freedoms of the high seas as they had
traditionally existed.
Three types of freedoms preoccupied these maritime powers,
each to varying degrees: freedom to conduct military activities,
freedom of navigation for merchant shipping, and freedom of fish-
ing. Thus, protecting the mobility and use of warships was a cen-
tral motivating force in organizing the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea. Indeed, in the end, those maritime
countries that had a major interest in preserving freedom of fishing
sacrificed that interest in large measure for the purpose of preserv-
ing the other freedoms. The Soviet Union is but one example.
Object and Organization
The object of this study is to examine the regime of warships
under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.3
Many of the provisions relevant to this question may be regarded
now, or in the future, as declaratory of customary international law
binding on all States irrespective of ratification of the Convention.
This may be so because these provisions reiterate the language of
provisions in the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea4 that
had this status, because they codify existing State practice, be-
cause they influence subsequent State practice, or because they
come to be regarded as decisive evidence of opinio juris5 Identifi-
cation of the specific provisions that may have this dual status is,
at this stage, speculative and beyond the scope of this study.
The Convention is not organized by type of ship or, with some
exceptions, by type of activity. Most of it is organized by zone. It
3. The study concentrates on changes in the law of the sea affecting the regime of war-
ships. Frequently, no change or only a minor change has been made in provisions copied
from the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea. In that case, it will be assumed that the
literature regarding the 1958 conventions is either familiar to or readily available to the
reader; no attempt will be made to repeat or to summarize it here.
4. The three 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea of particular relevance to this study
are the Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82; the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territo-
rial Sea Convention]; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
5. See Statement by the President, March 10, 1983, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383
(Mar. 14, 1983). The author addresses this question in A.W. Koers & B.H. Oxman, The 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea 668-80 (1984).
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sets forth legal rights and duties in the context of the regime for
each zone. It presents the zones of coastal State sovereignty first,
then the zones that may be regarded as intermediate in nature,
followed by the full classic high seas regime and a new regime for
the international seabed area.
If, in his classic treatise, Professor GidelP began with the regime
of the high seas because it was, at the time, the regime covering
the most significant area of the sea, an argument could be made
that the inquiry today should commence with the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. If, on the other hand, as one suspects, Professor Gidel
adopted that approach for the purposes of analytical clarity, it re-
mains as useful today. In any event, it is the approach adopted for
this study.
The study deals first with provisions of general applicability in
the Convention. It then examines rules specific to the regimes sea-
ward of the territorial sea: the high seas, the international seabed
area, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. It con-
cludes with internal waters, the territorial sea, straits, and
archipelagos.
A Note on War and Peace
To the extent one continues to divide public international law
into the two classic categories - the laws of war and the laws of
peace - the Convention on the Law of the Sea would doubtlessly
fall within the latter category. This is so in the sense that the rules
of armed conflict and neutrality are not addressed by the
Convention.
At the same time, the Convention does contain rules for dividing
the oceans into different jurisdictional zones. Some of the rules of
warfare and neutrality vary with the status of geographic areas.
The integration of the new regimes of the law of the sea with the
rules of naval and air warfare is accordingly a subject that merits
attention. The classic dichotomy in the law of the sea between in-
ternal waters and the territorial sea on the one hand, and the high
seas on the other, has yielded to new subtleties and modalities,
particularly in the regimes of straits, archipelagic waters, the ex-
clusive economic zone, and the continental shelf. To these are
added broad new duties to protect and preserve the marine
6. G. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer (1934).
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environment.
A detailed analysis of the implications of these changes for the
laws of war is, however, beyond the scope of this study. Still, it
must be noted that it would be contradictory to conclude that the
maritime powers that strove so long, hard and successfully to pre-
serve maximum freedom for military activities at sea in times of
peace envisaged that the new regimes of the law of the sea entailed
significant new restrictions on their freedom of operation in times
of armed conflict.
I. PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
1. The Definition of Warships
Article 29 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea contains the
following definition:
For the purposes of this Convention, "warship" means
a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing
the external marks distinguishing such ships of its na-
tionality, under the command of an officer duly commis-
sioned by the government of the State and whose name
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent,
and manned by a crew which is under regular armed
forces discipline.7
7. Convention, supra note 1, art. 29. The definition specifically uses the word "Conven-
tion" rather than "Part" or "Section." It would appear that the correct view is that the
definition, as expressly stated in its text, applies to the entire Convention.
Article 29 appears in part H of the Convention, which deals with the territorial sea and
contiguous zone, and more precisely, in section 3 of that part, which deals with innocent
passage in the territorial sea. It might perhaps be argued that the definition is therefore
applicable only to the regime of innocent passage. Proponents of this view may note that the
Convention begins with a general article 1 on use of terms throughout the Convention. How-
ever, article 1 of the Convention contains very few definitions, and these only from first
committee texts on deep seabed mining, third committee texts on marine pollution, and the
final clauses. Efforts in the drafting committee of the Conference to move additional defini-
tions of general applicability to article 1 did not succeed.
The basic legal rule on immunity of warships in article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention
on the High Seas is copied verbatim into article 95 of the 1982 Convention. It would indeed
be anomalous to assume that a decision was made to exclude the definition of warships in
article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention of the High Seas from application to the new high
seas regime and to add it to the new territorial sea regime, with no apparent reason. More-
over, since the 1958 Convention on the High Seas was originally part of a single set of arti-
cles on the entire law of the sea as prepared by the International Law Commission in 1956,
there is reason to believe that the definition was intended from the beginning to apply to all
of the sea, not just the high seas. See Report of the International Law Commission to the
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This definition is drawn from article 8, paragraph 2, of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas." Like its predecessor, article 29 does
not require that a ship be armed to be regarded as a warship. The
most significant change is that a ship no longer need belong to the
"naval" forces of a State, under the command of an officer whose
name appears in the "Navy list" and manned by a crew who are
under regular "naval" discipline. The more general reference to
"armed forces" is designed to accomodate the integration of the
different branches of the armed forces in various countries, the op-
eration of seagoing craft by some armies and air forces, and the
existence of a coast guard as a separate unit of the armed forces of
some States.
This definition is of importance only when the Convention dis-
tinguishes between rules applicable to warships and rules applica-
ble to other ships. Warships are a special subclass of government
ships operated for noncommercial purposes, which are themselves
a subclass of ships."
Whether or not the definition in article 29 is a functional one,
one may infer therefrom that a warship is regarded as a political
and military instrumentality of the State. To the extent the Con-
General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 253, U.N. Doc. AICN.4ISER.A1956.
8. Article 8, paragraph 2, provides:
For the purposes of these articles, the term "warship" means a ship belonging
to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing war-
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commi ioned by
the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a
crew who are under regular naval discipline.
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 4, art. 8, par. 2.
9. Thus, for example, since the pollution exception in article 236 of the Convention ap-
plies to warships as well as any other vessel owned or operated by a State and used for the
time being only on government noncommercial service, the precise line of demarcation be-
tween warships and other government noncommercial ships is of no special significance in
interpreting and applying that article.
The Convention uses the terms "ship" and "vessel" indiscriminately in its English text,
emphasizing the former in texts derived from the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea
and the latter in texts derived from various marine pollution conventions. The distinction
made in the English text does not appear in the official Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, or
Spanish texts, although the Russian text itself uses two different words where the other
texts, including the English, do not. There was broad agreement within the drafting com-
mittee of the Conference on including a provision in article 1 that the terms "ship" and
"vessel" and the two Russian terms have the same meaning, but the difficulties in translat-
ing such a provision into languages which did not use two different terms in the text and the
annoyance of some language groups at the inability of the English and Russian language
groups to select a single word led to the conclusion that it was unnecessary to make the
point in any event.
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vention contains special legal rules affecting warships as distin-
guished from other ships, we would expect these rules to deal with:
- the political or military activities of one State directed
at another;
- the law enforcement activities of one State directed at
the nationals of another; and
- the immunity of the political and military instrumen-
talities of a State from the jurisdiction of any other
State.
2. The Prohibition on the Threat or Use of Force
Article 301 of the Convention sets forth a prohibition on the
threat or use of force drawn from article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter of the United Nations.10 It is applicable to all activities
dealt with by the Convention. It states:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties
under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from
any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."
Particularly in view of article 103 of the U.N. Charter, 2 this pro-
vision would not seem to add anything (except perhaps emphasis)
to the existing obligations of States. The issue is whether addi-
tional legal consequences attach to violations of these obligations
under the Convention.
10. Article 2, paragraph 4, provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
11. Convention, supra note 1, art. 301. A similar obligation is included in article 19, para-
graph 2(a), regarding the meaning of innocent passage and article 39, paragraph 1(b), re-
garding the duties of ships and aircraft while exercising the right of transit passage.
12. Article 103 provides:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.
U.N. Charter art. 103.
[Vol. 24:4
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One such consequence is that the Convention provides in princi-
ple for the compulsory arbitration or adjudication of disputes be-
tween States regarding its interpretation or application. On the
other hand, a State is free to file a declaration excluding military
activities or disputes before the U.N. Security Council from this
dispute-settlement obligation.1"
It may perhaps be argued that an otherwise lawful exercise of a
right under the Convention would be rendered unlawful if the pur-
pose were an unlawful threat or use of force. Like the question of
third-party dispute settlement, this too becomes a question of the
consequences of violation - or more accurately, the consequences
of an alleged violation. In particular, the question is whether re-
sponses to the threat or use of force may be taken other than those
authorized by the U.N. Charter, which allows individual or collec-
tive self-defense in the event of armed attack or enforcement mea-
sures authorized by the U.N. Security Council. 14 Since the prohibi-
tion on the threat or use of force in the Law of the Sea Convention
is a cross-reference to the Charter, it follows that the answer to
this question is in the negative absent additional provisions in the
Convention. The use of force against a military instrumentality of
a foreign State - that is a warship of a foreign State - in a situa-
tion or manner not authorized by the Charter, is itself a violation
of both the Charter and the Convention, even if the purpose is to
deal with an alleged violation of the Charter and the Convention.
This seemingly obvious point can be overlooked if one makes the
error of thinking of the issue in terms of "law enforcement." That
term is properly applied to the relationship between a government
and persons or ships subject to its enforcement jurisdiction. An at-
tempt to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction against a foreign
warship is in fact an attempt to threaten or use force against a
sovereign instrumentality of a foreign State. That is primarily the
subject matter of the law regarding the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, not the law of the sea as such - with a
notable qualification in the case of innocent passage in the territo-
rial sea, which will be discussed later in this study.
13.'Convention, supra note 1, arts. 286, 298. For further discussion on this matter, see
infra text accompanying notes 38-43.
14. See U.N Charter arts. 39-51.
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3. Immunities of Warships
Article 32 of the Convention provides as follows:
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A
and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention af-
fects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. 15
Article 32 is derived from article 22 of the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone."8
One difference between the two provisions is that article 32 uses
the words "nothing in this Convention" while article 22 says
"nothing in these articles," limiting its applicability to articles
dealing with internal waters, the territorial sea and the contiguous
zone. Since both article 8 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
and article 95 of the 1982 Convention expressly provide for the
complete immunity of warships on the high seas from the jurisdic-
tion of any State other than the flag State, and since article 95 of
the 1982 Convention also applies within the exclusive economic
zone (pursuant to article 58), article 32 cannot be regarded as ap-
plying to the high seas and economic zone regimes in the sense
that it would nullify the effect of article 95.
This change in text relates to two structural considerations.
First, if article 32 used the word "Part" rather than "Convention,"
it would narrow the scope of applicability of the rule. Subjects
such as passage through straits used for international navigation,
which are dealt with in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, are
not dealt with in part II of the Convention containing the articles
on the territorial sea, but rather in another part.1 8 The subject
matter of part IV of the Convention, archipelagic baselines and
archipelagic passage, although not addressed in the 1958 Territo-
rial Sea Convention because the concept was rejected at that time,
clearly falls within the scope of subjects dealt with by the 1958
15. Convention, supra note 1, art. 32.
16. Article 22 provides:
1. The rules contained in sub-section A and in article 18 shall apply to govern.
ment ships operated for non-commercial purposes.
2. With such exceptions as are contained in the provisions referred to in the
preceeding paragraph, nothing in these articles affects the immunities which
such ships enjoy under these articles or other rules of international law.
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 4, art. 22.
17. See id. art. 14.




The second structural consideration is related but somewhat
broader. The 1958 conference divided the International Law Com-
mission's unified articles on the law of the sea into four conven-
tions.'9 Only two were of particular relevance to the regime of war-
ships, namely the Territorial Sea Convention and the High Seas
Convention. The 1982 Convention reproduces the substance of
much of those two conventions in only two of its seventeen parts
and nine annexes, others of which also affect the regime of war-
ships. Accordingly, the use of the term "Convention" avoids the
possibility of ambiguity.
Another difference between the two provisions is that article 22
of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention does not refer to warships.
Although as a logical matter it may be maintained that warships
are a subset of the category of government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes, article 22 appears in a sub-section entitled
"Rules Applicable to Government Ships Other Than Warships,"
and is followed by a different subsection entitled "Rule Applicable
to Warships." The rule contained in the latter subsection, substan-
tially repeated in article 30 of the 1982 Convention, provides that
if a warship does not comply with a request to respect coastal
State regulations regarding passage through the territorial sea, the
coastal State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea.
The power to require departure from its territory is of course the
classic remedy for a State that lacks enforcement jurisdiction over
the sovereign agent or instrumentality of a foreign State, be it a
diplomat or a warship.
Compared with the ringing declaration of "complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state" for gov-
ernment noncommerical ships on the high seas in article 9 of the
Convention on the High Seas,2" the formulation "nothing in this
Convention affects" 21 seems somewhat less decisive. This is be-
cause, in 1958, there was some difference of opinion regarding the
scope and the effect of the immunities of government noncommer-
cial ships other than warships when in the territorial sea. The ad-
19. In addition to the three conventions cited supra note 4, there was also the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958,
17 U.S.T. 138, T.IA.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
20. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 4, art. 9. This article was copied into article
96 of the 1982 Convention.
21. Convention, supra note 1, art. 32.
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dition of warships to this clause in the 1982 Convention does not,
however, reflect any dispute regarding the scope or effect of the
immunity of warships. Rather, it reflects a common opinion that
the rules of international law regarding immunity of warships and
government noncommercial ships will continue to apply. This ex-
plains the deletion of the arguably illogical reference to "the im-
munities which such ships enjoy under these articles" that appears
in article 22 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.22 It does not,
however, explain the deletion of the reference to international law
in article 32.
As a purely textual matter, the last preambular paragraph of the
1982 Convention conpensates for the deletion of the reference to
international law, as it affirms "that matters not regulated by this
Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of
general international law."23 The deletion reflects a general (al-
though not consistent) allergy toward references to international
law in the Convention by representatives of developing countries
who, for unrelated reasons, fought such references in the U.N.
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties2' and in the U.N. Declara-
tion of Principles regarding the seabeds beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction.25 Both the context of article 32 and the
preambular provision cited suggest that no change in legal result is
mandated by the deletion of the reference to international law.
The "exceptions" referred to in article 22, paragraph 2, of the
1958 Territorial Sea Convention are all included in the "exception"
for sub-section A referred to in article 32 of the 1982 Convention.2 0
Sub-section A contains the rules regarding innocent passage in the
territorial sea applicable to all ships. The point being made is that
immunity from enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State does
not excuse a warship from the duty to respect the provisions of the
Convention regarding the regulation of innocent passage. The word
"exception" is not the best word that could have been selected to
convey the nature of this cross-reference.
Article 32 of the new Convention also contains two other cross-
22. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 4, art. 22.
23. Convention, supra note 1, art. 30.
24. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
25. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Declaration of Principles].
26. Compare Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 4, arts. 14-18 with Convention, supra
note 1, arts. 17-26, 30, 31.
[Vol. 24:4
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references in its list of "exceptions." The first, to article 30, is a
cross-reference to the rule that the coastal State may require a
warship to leave the territorial sea if it does not comply with a
request to respect regulations regarding innocent passage.2 7 Again,
the word "exception" was not the best choice.
The final "exception" refers to a provision added by the 1982
Convention regarding international responsibility of the flag State
for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from non-
compliance with innocent passage regulations by warships or non-
commercial government ships.28 This too is hardly an exception to
the rule of immunity. It is a legal consequence of the fact which
gives rise to the immunity in the first place, namely that the war-
ship is a sovereign instrumentality of the flag State.
4. The Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment
The change in the preoccupations of governments between the
time that the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea were com-
pleted and the time that the 1982 Convention was completed is no
more evident than in the extensive provisions in the 1982 Conven-
tion on the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
A large and elaborate part of the Convention is devoted to this
subject.2 9 It begins with an uncharacteristically categorical state-
ment that "States have the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment."30 In addition, the chapters dealing with in-
dividual regimes applicable to particular geographic areas contain
extensive environmental protection provisions."m
27. The text of article 30 provides:
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request
for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to
leave the territorial sea immediately.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 30.
28. Article 31 provides:
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any lo2 or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other gov-
ernment ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regula-
tions of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Id. art. 31.
29. Id. pt. XIL
30. Id. art. 192.
31. See id. arts. 19, para. 2(h); 21, para. 1; 22, para. 2; 23; 39, para. 2(b); 42, para. 1(b); 43,
para. b; 56; 79, para. 2; 94, para. 3; 123; 145; 240, para. d; 266, para. 2; 277, para. c; 290 297,
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Accordingly, the "warship exception" contained in article 236 is
of particular significance:
The provisions of this Convention regarding the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment do
not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or
aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the
time being, only on government non-commercial service.
However, each State shall ensure, by the adoption of ap-
propriate measures not impairing operations or opera-
tional capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or op-
erated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner
consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with
this Convention. 2
This article goes further than providing warships with immunity
from enforcement by a State other than the flag State. Warships
are declared exempt from the provisions of the Convention, includ-
ing the duties imposed by the Convention to observe national and
international regulations, regarding the protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment.
Article 236 was adopted for several reasons. Pollution regula-
tions of a general character, including international regulations,
may be inappropriate to the special configuration or mission of cer-
tain warships.33 It was also feared that coastal States, in the exer-
para. 1(c).
32. Id. art. 236. The word "or" appears after "naval auxiliary" in the International Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973, art. 3, I.M.C.O. Doc.
MP/CONF/WP.35, reprinted in 12 LL.M. 1319 (1973). It was erroneously omitted from the
English text of article 236.
The text was originally copied correctly. Informal Single Negotiating Text, pt. III, art. 42,
IV Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Official Records 137, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Official Records]. When a reference to air-
craft was added the next year, the "or" was omitted in the Revised Single Negotiating Text,
pt. III, art. 45, and was never replaced. V Official Records 125, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/
Rev. 1 (1976). The French text of article 236 uses the conjunction "hi" after the reference to
naval auxiliaries. All of the other provisions of the English text dealing with ships entitled
to sovereign immunity make clear that a general reference to "ships" or "vessels" is quali-
fied by the clause "owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
government non-commercial service," or its equivalent. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 1,
arts. 31; 32; 42, para. 5; 96. In light of these factors, as well as the punctuation of article 236
in English and the absurd result of regarding the reference to "other vessels" as unqualified,
the difficulty created by the omission of the word "or" is purely grammatical, not legal.
33. This was the reason for the inclusion of the predecessor of article 236 in the Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 32, art. 3.
[Vol. 24:4
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cise of powers to prevent and control pollution from foreign ships,
could thereby acquire leverage over warship passage in general,
and the passage of nuclear warships in particular. A question re-
garding the compliance of a warship with a particular standard
might require the inspection or release of data regarding the ship,
its design or its equipment - data which most flag States would
be reluctant to disclose.
Because warships were not considered a substantial source of
marine pollution, and because the rules of sovereign immunity
would have restricted the possibilities of enforcement against the
will of the flag State in any event, there was no significant opposi-
tion to article 236. Moreover, given the political mission of naval
vessels that operate far from their home shores in peacetime, it
was not considered unrealistic to expect a high degree of self-im-
posed environmental diligence by major flag States in any event.
34. As in the case of article 29, discussed supra note 5, it may be argued that since article
236 appears in part XHI of the Convention ("Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment"), it applies only to the provisions of that part.
A closer examination of pollution provisions in other parts of the Convention is necessary
to assess this argument-
- Of the geographic regimes applicable seaward of the territorial sea that con-
tain anti-pollution provisions, those in article 56 of part V on the exclusive eco-
nomic zone are merely a cross-reference to part XII, and those in part XI and its
related annexes on deep seabed mining affect, by definition, only exploration
and exploitation of mineral resources of the area, activities not relevant to
warships.
- In so far as innocent passage in the territorial sea is concerned, the elaborate
treatment of this issue in part XII, article 211, paragraph 4, and article 220,
paragraph 2, the express cross-reference to part II, section 3 of the Convention
in article 211, paragraph 4, and the reverse cross-reference from part II to part
XII in article 19, paragraph 2(h), and the chapeau of article 21, paragraph 1,
would render exceedingly awkward any attempt to isolate the applicability of
article 236 to the provisions of part XII
- The right of transit passage in straits in article 38 and the right of archipe-
lagic sea lanes passage in archipelagic waters in article 53 are more liberal than
the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea but more restricted than the
full freedom of navigation beyond the territorial sea. It would be difficult to jua-
tify an argument that article 236 applies to both the freedom of navigation and
the right of innocent passage, but does not apply to the transit passage and
archipelagic sea lanes passage regimes.
Just as the Convention does not contain an article for all generally applicable definitions,
it does not contain a single chapter dealing with all provisions applicable to the entire Con-
vention. The brief part XVI entitled "General Provisions" is a collection of a few items left
over largely from Second Committee negotiations that were placed in a separate part in
order to avoid reopening substantive negotiations in the Second Committee. In fact, part
XII itself is a chapter of general applicability to the Convention on the subject of protection
and preservation of the marine environment.
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5. The Disclosure of Sensitive Information
Under Article 302, nothing in the Convention "shall be deemed
to require a State Party. . .to supply information the disclosure
of which is contrary to the essential interests of its security."' 5
Such a provision obviously applies to the construction, equipment,
armaments, manning and capabilities of most warships. It also ap-
plies, at least some of the time, to their location, operations, and
mission.
Article 302 is based on article 223, paragraph 1(a), of the 1957
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity." The most significant difference is that an objective test -
disclosure of information "is" contrary to the essential security in-
terest of a State - was substituted for a subjective test - the
State "considers" such disclosure to be contrary to those essential
interests.
During discussion of this change, two points were made. First,
there was opposition to reproducing the text verbatim from the
Treaty of Rome because only a few States controlled its history
and interpretation. Second, there is no difference in the applica-
tion of the two formulae, since a State cannot be expected to dis-
close the information to foreigners - including judges not subject
to its security laws and procedures - for purposes of reviewing its
determination. The reason for the difference is to emphasize the
need to make a good faith determination as required by the gen-
eral "good faith" provision of article 300.17
Accordingly, there would appear to be little if any basis for concluding that article 236
means anything other than what it expressly states, namely that it applies to the entire
Convention, and accordingly to all international and national environmental regulations re-
ferred to therein. Whether such an exclusion may be invoked by non-parties to the Conven-
tion as a rule of customary international law is a question beyond the scope of this essay.
35. Convention, supra note 1, art. 302.
36. Article 223, paragraph 1(a) provides:
No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security. . ..
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 223, para. I(a),
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
37. Article 300 provides:
States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in
this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.




Subject to certain exceptions regarding coastal State jurisdiction
over natural resources and other matters, all disputes between
States relating to the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion that have not been settled by other means, and that are not
subject to binding third-party arbitration or adjudication under
another treaty, are subject to binding arbitration or adjudication
under the Convention.38 On the other hand, a State party may at
any time declare that it excludes certain categories of disputes
from this dispute-settlement obligation, including inter alia:
- disputes concerning military activities, including mili-
tary activities by government vessels and aircraft en-
gaged in noncommercial service;39
- disputes concerning coastal State law enforcement ac-
tivities with regard to marine scientific research or
fisheries in its economic zone;'
- disputes in respect of which the Security Council of
the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to
it by the Charter of the United Nations, unless the Se-
curity Council decides to remove the matter from its
agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it by the means
provided for in the Convention. 41
Since the text of the Convention distinguishes between military
activities and law enforcement activities, it would appear that law
enforcement activities that are neither military activities, nor an
exercise of coastal State enforcement rights over marine scientific
research or fisheries in the exclusive economic zone, are subject to
compulsory, third-party settlement.
The most important situation in which this might occur is one in
which it is alleged that a warship of a coastal State, not engaged in
military activities but attempting to enforce coastal State regula-
tions, has acted in contravention of the provisions of the Conven-
tion in regard to freedom of navigation. The exclusion of law en-
forcement activities applies only to coastal State law enforcement
38. Id. arts. 282, 286.
39. Id. art. 298, para. 1(b).
40. Id. See also id. art 297, paras. 2-3.
41. Id. art. 298, para. 1(c).
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activities in regard to the exercise of fishery and marine scientific
research rights.42 Disputes regarding the exercise by the coastal
State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction are subject to third-
party settlement when it is alleged that the coastal State has acted
in contravention of the freedoms and rights of navigation of an-
other State.43
Thus, the arbitrary or unwarranted boarding, search or arrest of
a foreign merchant ship navigating in the economic zone by a war-
ship or coast guard vessel of the coastal State in a law enforcement
situation would be subject to compulsory, third-party settlement
on grounds of unlawful interference with navigation. This result
was considered particularly important in order to protect freedom
of navigation while also according broad new pollution enforce-
ment rights to coastal States in the economic zone.
A nice question is posed as to whether a boarding in the eco-
nomic zone on grounds of suspicion of piracy would constitute a
military activity subject to exclusion of third-party settlement, or a
law enforcement activity subject to compulsory, third-party settle-
ment. The issue would appear to be whether liability can be as-
signed for loss or damage caused by seizure and, perhaps, boarding
and inspection effected without adequate grounds where the ship
has not committed any act justifying the suspicions. The textual
question is whether "law enforcement" is exclusively, or merely
primarily, a reference to the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction
rather than universal enforcement jurisdiction.
It should be noted that while many substantive provisions 'of the
Convention may be (or may come to be) regarded as declaratory of
customary international law binding on all States whether or not
party to the Convention, submission to compulsory, third-party
dispute-settlement procedures is generally thought to require ex-
press agreement.
II. AREAS SEAWARD OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
1. The High Seas
The regime of the high seas applies to "all parts of the sea that
are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic wa-
42. Id. art. 298, para. 1(b). See also id. art. 297, paras. 2-3.
43. Id. art. 297, para. 1(a).
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ters of an archipelagic state.'' Much of that regime also applies
within the exclusive economic zone to the extent it is not incom-
patible with the provisions on the exclusive economic zone.'5
The basic principle of the freedom of the high seas is set forth in
article 8746 which is based on article 2 of the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas.47 However, subparagraphs 1(d) and 1(f) of the new
article 87 refer to freedoms that are not expressly mentioned in the
old article 2. Moreover, while the chapeau of article 87, paragraph
1, retains the words "inter alia," indicating that the list of free-
doms is not exhaustive, paragraph 2 substitutes a reference to "the
freedom of the high seas" for the reference to "[t]hese freedoms,
44. Id. art. 86.
45. Id. art. 58.
46. Article 87 provides:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Free-
dom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Conven-
tion and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for
coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted
under international law, subject to part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to parts VI and XIIL
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and
also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activi-
ties in the Area.
Id. art. 87.
Part VI of the Convention deals with the continental shell Part XI of the Convention
deals with marine scientific research.
Pursuant to definitions in articles 1 and 133 of the Convention, "activities in the Area"
means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the mineral rezource of the sea-
bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
47. Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to sub-
ject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised
under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of inter-
national law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;,
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas;
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 4, art. 2.
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and others which are recognized by the general principles of inter-
national law" in the 1958 Convention.' 8 While the reason for the
change is not clear,'49 the retention of the words "inter alia" sug-
gests either that the change has no legal significance or that it
eliminates the need for demonstrating that a non-enumerated free-
dom is "recognized by the general principles of international
law.9" 0
Warships of course do much more than point-to-point navigation
characteristic of merchant ships. In the context of the high seas
beyond the exclusive economic zone, whether one regards these ac-
tivities as embraced by the word "navigation" - as submerged
navigation certainly is - or by the words "inter alia" is largely a
matter of taste. This question acquires greater significance in the
context of the exclusive economic zone and will be addressed in
that context.
Article 87 and most of the other high seas articles of the 1982
Convention substantially repeat the provisions of the 1958 Conven-
tion on the High Seas. The preamble of the Convention of the
High Seas expressly declares itself to be a codification of long-
standing customary international law.51 This supports the conclu-
sion that warships, absent specific new restraints to the contrary,
remain free in principle to do the things that warships have cus-
tomarily done, including maneuvers, patrol, anchoring, surveil-
lance, and weapons exercises. Since the warship is a political and
military instrumentality of the State, it is assumed that the war-
ship is engaged, or may well be engaged, in an activity of a political
or military nature directed at one or more other States.
The mere fact that warships enjoy a broad range of freedoms in
principle does not mean that they, any more than other ships on
the high seas, may ignore the rights of others who use the high
48. Id.
49. It was possibly related to the dispute as to whether seabed mining seaward of the
continental shelf could be regarded as a freedom of the high seas under customary interna-
tional law.
50. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 4, art. 2.
51. The preamble provides:
The States Parties to this Convention,
Desiring to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas,
Recognizing that the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held
at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, adopted the following provisions
as generally declaratory of established principles of international law,
Have agreed as follows ....
Id. preamble.
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seas. Thus all freedoms of the high seas must be exercised "with
due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas" and rights in the international seabed
area.52 It would appear that physical interference with the opera-
tion of foreign ships, as well as damage to the object of their activi-
ties, would come withii the scope of this rule. However, it is not
mere interference or damage that is prohibited, but interference
without due regard for the interests of the other State or States
involved: a balancing of interests in the use of the seas is required.
Like other ships owned or operated by a State and used only on
government noncommercial service, warships on the high seas
"have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other
than the flag state."5 3 A warship may not be boarded, even on sus-
picion of piracy, unless the crew has mutinied, taken control of the
ship, and committed acts of piracy."
The right of visit on the high seas is - or more accurately was
- unique to warships. That right has now been extended to mili-
tary aircraft and "to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service."' s
The circumstances justifying a visit are set forth in article 110,
paragraph 1, of the Convention. 6
52. Convention, supra note 1, art. 87, para. 2. The change from "reasonable regard" in the
English text of article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas to "due regard" in the
English text of the 1982 Convention is the result of a retranslation of the Spanish term
"debida consideracion" (which is the Spanish equivalent of "reasonable regard" in the Con-
vention on the High Seas) as "due regard" or "due consideration" in proposed Second Com-
mittee texts originally drafted by Spanish.speaking delegates. There was no suggestion that
the change was substantive. On the other hand, paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 147, a First
Committee text, were drawn directly from proposals by the United States, and thus retained
the "reasonable regard" terminology. In this connection, it should be noted that articles 87,
paragraph 2, and 147, paragraph 3, in part address the same duty, but usa "due regard" and
"reasonable regard" respectively to express that duty.
53. Id. art. 95.
54. Id. art. 102.
55. Id. art. 110, para. 5. This extension is arguably a technical correction, conforming to a
similar extension with respect to piracy in the 1958 Convention on the igh Seas, arts. 21;
23, paragraph 4. These extensions are probably unnecessary in light of the amendments to
the definition of warships in the 1982 Convention, art. 29. The broad drafting of article 110,
paragraph 5, may come to be regretted if--as intimated by some British experts-States
begin to delegate such police powers to private persons on oil rigs. Private armies died (or
should have died) with feudalism; "privateering" at sea died (or should have died) with
mercantilism.
56. Article 110, in part, provides:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship nti-
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The most significant difference between article 110 and its pred-
ecessor, article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas, is the addi-
tion of subparagraphs 1(c) and 1(d). 57 The right of visit under sub-
paragraph 1(c) extends to the warships of any State where
transmissions can be received or any State where authorized radio
communication is suffering interference."' They may proceed to ar-
rest any person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and
seize the broadcasting apparatus. 9
Warships, military aircraft, and "other ships or aircraft clearly
marked and identifiable as being on government service"'0 may
"seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy
and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize
the property on board." 61 The police powers of the warship in this
respect derive not from any particular right of the flag State, but
rather from the impracticality - or some modern commentators
might say the inefficiency - of allocating this right only to partic-
ular States. The necessity of suppressing private violence in the
vast open areas of the sea, combined with this impracticality, gave
tied to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified
in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy,
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the
warship has jurisdiction under Article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in real-
ity, of the same nationality as the warship.
Id. art. 110, para. 1.
57. Another more technical change is that the clause in article 110, "a foreign ship, other
than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with Articles 95 and 96," id. art.
110, replaced the 1958 phrase "a foreign merchant ship," Convention on the High Seas,
supra note 4, art. 22. One might also note that the 1982 Convention uses the English neuter
pronoun "it," rather than the feminine "she," in references to a ship. Female delegates from
a variety of English-speaking countries supported the change. The British delegation, repre-
senting a female head of State and a female head of government, took no position on the
issue.
58. Convention, supra note 1, art. 109. The main significance of this amendment sought
by EEC member States is its incorporation by reference into the economic zone regime. Id.
art. 58, para. 2. In that area, its extension to installations is arguably unnecessary in light of,
and arguably qualified by, the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State over installations
and structures used for economic purposes. Id. art. 60, para. 1(b).
59. Id. art. 109, para. 4. Broadcasting is unauthorized if it is "intended for reception by
the general public contrary to international regulations" (excluding distress calls). Id. art.
109, para. 2.
60. Id. art. 107.
61. Id. art. 105.
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rise to the duty of all States to "cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other
place outside the jurisdiction of any State.""2
An attempt was made at the Conference to extend this universal
jurisdiction to cover illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances. This effort was complicated by the fact that
there is some lawful traffic in many of these drugs and substances,
that some may be carried for purposes of medical treatment of per-
sons on board, and that the definition of the terms "narcotic
drugs" and "psychotropic substances" has been extended so far
that it is probable that, unknown to those responsible for the ship,
some such substance may be in the possession of crew members or
passengers aboard a large number of ships, whether for purposes of
consumption or traffic. Accordingly, it was feared that there was
too much potential for abuse and harrassment, either in good faith
or as a pretext.
Thus, the Convention is limited in principle to a general require-
ment that States cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances on the high seas con-
trary to international conventions, and to providing that a flag
State may request the cooperation of other States to suppress such
traffic.63 Clearly, a warship may board a vessel at the request, or
with the consent, of the State whose flag the vessel is flying. Thus,
bilateral and regional arrangements that permit boarding, inspec-
tion and seizure of ships suspected of unlawful trafficking in drugs
may be used, and are now common in the Western Hemisphere.
One must also bear in mind the clarification in article 110 that a
warship may board a foreign ship if there is reasonable ground for
suspecting that the ship is without nationality." In this connec-
tion, a ship which sails under two or more flags, flying them ac-
cording to convenience, may be assimilated to a ship without na-
tionality.65 This provision, like bilateral boarding arrangements,
can be of significant aid in controlling the illegal drug trade at sea.
2. Reservation for Peaceful Purposes
The 1982 Convention provides that the high seas "shall be re-
62. I& art. 100.
63. Id. art. 108.
64. Id. art. 110, para. 1(d).
65. Id. arL 92.
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served for peaceful purposes.""8 This provisipn also applies to the
economic zone. 7 Much has been written on the question of the
meaning of the term "peaceful purposes" as used in various inter-
national instruments. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the
present study; nevertheless, some comments on the matter are in
order.
Similar provisions previously appeared in the Antarctic Treaty,e8
the Outer Space Treaty,"9 and the United Nations General Assem-
bly declaration on the seabed beyond the limits of national juris-
diction.70 In the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, the
"peaceful purposes" language is followed immediately by specific
prohibitions on military fortifications, military maneuvers, and
testing of weapons. In the Declaration of Principles governing the
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, it was contem-
plated that specific military prohibitions would be agreed upon in
the context of arms control negotiations. This was done, and re-
sulted in the treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed.7
This history would seem to indicate that a "peaceful purposes"
clause does not, in and of itself, have specific arms control con-
tent.2 Moreover, the preamble of the Convention does not identify
66. Id. art. 88.
67. Id. art. 58, para. 2.
68. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. I, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.
69. Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer
Space Treaty].
70. Declaration of Principles, supra note 25, at 24.
71. Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, done Feb.
11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter cited as Seabed
Arms Control Treaty].
72. On the other hand, it can be argued that there are implications in the Antarctic and
Outer Space treaties that the term is not devoid of all meaning. The sentence immediately
following the "peaceful purposes" clause in the Antarctic treaty states, "There shall be pro-
hibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as . . . ." Antarctic Treaty,
supra note 68, art. I. What informs the meaning of 'inter alia"? In the Outer Space Treaty,
the "peaceful purposes" clause applies only to the moon and other celestial bodies, not to
outer space. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 69, art. IV. A negative implication of content in
the "peaceful purposes" clause derived from its geographically restricted use in the Outer
Space Treaty is nevertheless confused by the fact that the Outer Space Treaty expressly
prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer
space, to which the "peaceful purposes" clause does not as such apply; yet the prohibition
REGIME OF WARSHIPS
arms control as one of its objectives.73 In that regard its purpose
differs significantly from the Antarctic and Outer Space treaties.
It would presumably be common ground that the "peaceful pur-
poses" clause, if it has legal content, prohibits military activities
inconsistent with the U.N. Charter. The question is whether other
military activities are prohibited, particularly in light of the Con-
vention's general prohibition on the threat or use of force contrary
to the U.N. Charter. 4 To be more precise, the question is: if the
"peaceful purposes" clause has legal content beyond a prohibition
on military activities inconsistent with the U.N. Charter, but is not
a specific arms control measure as such, what are the other
possibilities?
The size and complexity of the Convention is intrinsic evidence
that a one-sentence reference to peaceful purposes, applicable to
all activities of all States, including coastal States, in both the ex-
clusive economic zone and the high seas beyond, and therefore in
all of the seas and oceans seaward of the territorial sea, was not
intended to impose new legal restraints on military activities at
sea. The history of the military use of the sea is measured in mil-
lennia. As the Antarctic and Outer Space treaties indicate, legal
restraints on military activities, even in areas where substantial
military activities have not previously occurred, require more de-
tail than a single sentence. If there is anything that is clear from
the legislative record of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, it is
on emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty was precisely the specific implementation of the "peaceful purposes"
clause in the U.N. Declaration of Principles on the seabeds beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
73. The most relevant of the specific preambular paragraphs recognizes:
the desirability of establishing... a legal order for the seas and oceans which
will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses
of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources,
the conservation of their living resources and the study, protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment ....
Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
The very next preambular paragraph begins, "Bearing in mind that the achievement of
such goals will contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international economic
order ..... Id. (emphasis added). The contribution to "the strengthening of peace, secur-
ity, cooperation and friendly relations among all nations" is effected not by any specific
rules, but by the overall "codification and progressive development of the law of the sea
achieved in this Convention." Id. The preamble concludes by "[a]ffirming that matters not
regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general
international law." Id.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
19841
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:4
that one of the primary motivations of the major maritime powers
in negotiating a new Convention was to protect the broadest possi-
ble freedom to conduct military activities at sea. It is unlikely that
they would have agreed to legal restraints on those very activities
without significant negotiation and detail.
Needless to say, the meaning of the "peaceful purposes" clause
in each legal instrument must be interpreted in the context of that
instrument. In the context of the Convention, if the clause has any
meaning beyond an injunction to observe the prohibitions of the
U.N. Charter in conducting military activities at sea, it may be re-
garded at most as aspirational: a policy goal for States in the con-
duct of future arms control negotiations in the appropriate fora
and context. 5
To some, this explication of the "peaceful purposes" clause may
constitute an indelicate revelation that there is little if any sub-
stance to the rhetoric. It is not unlike questioning the pledges of
eternal friendship in a freshly negotiated treaty of peace between
traditional enemies. To others, shaping rhetoric is a useful first
step in setting the agenda for negotiation of the future law, albeit
in another setting at another time.
3. The International Seabed Area
The international seabed "Area" is defined as "the seabed and
75. For those who prefer to rely more heavily on linguistic nuance, it is notable that arti.
cle 88 of the Convention says the high seas "shall be reserved for peaceful purposes," with-
out using the word "only" or "exclusively." Convention, supra note 1, art. 88. They would
contrast this language with article 141 of the Convention, which provides that the interna-
tional seabed area shall be open to use "exclusively for peaceful purposes," id. art. 141, with
article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty, which provides that Antarctica shall be used for "peaceful
purposes only," Antarctic Treaty, supra note 68, art. 1, and with article 4 of the Outer Space
Treaty, which provides that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used "exclusively
for peaceful purposes." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 69, art. 4.
One practical difficulty with this linguistic approach is that it would require the attribu-
tion of greater legal consequences to the "peaceful purposes" proscription in connection
with the international seabed area, without any intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to support the
distinction or provide guidance as to its nature. The articles on the high seas and the arti-
cles on the international seabed area were prepared in separate committees generally at-
tended by different personnel even on smaller delegations. The drafting committee of the
Conference operated under great time pressure, and was able to harmonize particular texts
only if there was no objection from any quarter. Harmonization of texts emanating from two
different committees required delegates in the drafting committee to achieve the agreement
of their governments' representatives in both committees, a task that not infrequently en-
tailed insurmountable logistical, political or personality problems. Much was done, but
much also could not be done. See, e.g., supra note 52.
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ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national juris-
diction. ' 7 Except in the unusual case of an isolated uninhabitable
rock,77 the international seabed area is, in effect, the seabed be-
yond the seaward limit of the continental shelf of the coastal State
as defined in the Convention. That limit is 200 nautical miles from
the coastal baselines or the outer edge of the continental margin,
whichever is further seaward.78 All of the international seabed area
therefore lies beneath waters of the high seas.
Virtually all of the provisions regarding the international seabed
area are concerned with "activities in the Area."1 0 This term is de-
fined to mean "all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of,
the resources of the Area."80 Accordingly, these provisions are es-
sentially of no relevance to the regime of warships, except that
under article 87, and the companion provision in article 147, para-
graph 3, the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas must be car-
ried out with due regard (or reasonable regard) for rights with re-
spect to "activities in the Area."
Article 87 expressly refers to high seas freedoms that involve use
of the seabed, such as laying of cables and pipelines and construct-
ing artificial islands and installations, and implies other such uses
(for example, anchoring).8 " A question therefore may arise as to
whether the provisions regarding the international seabed area,
aside from those dealing with exploration and exploitation of min-
eral resources, are inconsistent with the high seas regime or, to be
more specific, with the exercise of high seas freedoms by warships
involving the use of the seabed.
The basic provisions on the international seabed area that are
not expressly limited to the question of exploration and exploita-
tion of mineral resources are articles 136,2 137,83 138, and 141.85
76. Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 1(1).
77. Id. art. 121.
78. Id. art. 76.
79. Id. art. 1, para. 1(3).
80. Id.
81. For the text of article 87, see supra note 46.
82. Article 136 provides:
The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 136.
83. Article 137, in part, provides:
No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sover-
eign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
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There is also an article on marine scientific research, which pro-
vides that "States parties may carry out marine scientific research
in the Area," contains its own "peaceful purposes" provision, and
encourages international cooperation in marine scientific
research.86
Article 137 is a more elaborate analog of the prohibition on
claims of sovereignty on the high seas contained in article 89.87
The "open to use" clause of article 141 parallels the statement in
article 8788 that the high seas are open to all States. The "peaceful
purposes" clause of article 141 parallels the provision of article 888s
that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes, which
has already been discussed. The marine scientific research provi-
sions"0 are an abbreviated statement of those that apply to all
marine scientific research under part XIII, sections 1 and 2.91
This leaves only the "common heritage" principle of article 136.
The most serious question posed by the "common heritage" princi-
ple is whether activities specifically regulated by the provisions of
the Convention regarding the international seabed area - and
particularly those activities for which authorization from the Inter-
Id. art. 137.
84. Article 138 provides:
The general conduct of States in relation to the Area shall be in accordance
with the provisions of this Part, the principles embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations and other rules of international law in the interests of maintain-
ing peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual
understanding.
Id. art. 138.
85. Article 141 provides:
The Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all States,
whether coastal or land-locked, without discrimination and without prejudice to
the other provisions of this Part.
Id. art. 141.
86. Id. art. 143. The issues posed are discussed elsewhere in connection with the "peaceful
purposes" clause on the high seas, see supra text accompanying notes 41-49, and marine
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, see infra text
accompanying notes 133-43.
87. Article 89 provides:
No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 89.
88. For the text of article 87, see supra note 46.
89. Article 88 provides:
The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 88.
90. Id. art. 143.
91. Id. arts. 238-244.
REGMIE OF WARsHsS
national Seabed Authority is required - may be conducted
outside, or in a manner inconsistent with, the Convention system.
Since the provisions of the Convention regarding the international
seabed area contain no specific regulation of, or restraints on, the
activity of warships or other military activities, other than those
that apply under the regime of the high seas, resolution of that
question has no bearing on the matters being addressed in this
essay.
91
Accordingly it would appear that there is nothing in the provi-
sions regarding the international seabed area that is inconsistent
with the exercise of high seas freedoms by warships.
4. The Exclusive Economic Zone
There are a number of provisions in the Convention regarding
the exclusive economic zone that are relevant to this inquiry. 3 The
activities that may be conducted by all States without coastal
State consent or control are enumerated in article 58, paragraphs 1
92. The issue would arise of course in the unlikely event that a warship engaged in explo-
ration or exploitation of mineral resources.
93. See, e.g., the following articles. Article 55 provides:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other
States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
Id. art. 55.
Article 57 provides:
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Id. art. 57. Pursuant to article 3 of the Convention, the landward limit of the exclusive
economic zone is a maximum of 12 miles from the coastal baseline.
Article 59 provides:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the
coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a con-
flict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or
States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of
all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of




The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of
a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. This article does
not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive
economic zone in accordance with article 58.
Id. art. 86.
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and 2."' Those two paragraphs are therefore the basic source for
ascertaining the legal rights of warships in the economic zone.
The activities in the economic zone requiring the consent of, and
subject to the control of, the coastal State are identified in article
56, paragraph 1(a), and in the articles to which paragraphs 1(b)
and 1(c) refer.95 However, as previously discussed, pursuant to arti-
cle 236, provisions regarding the protection and the preservation of
the marine environment do not apply to warships."'
94. Article 58 provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked,
enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, freedoms referred to
in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and sub-
marine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this
Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the
exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention
in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations
adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
tion and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible
with this Part.
Id. art. 58.
Article 87 sets forth the freedoms of the high seas. Articles 88 to 115 comprise all of part
VII on the high seas except for articles 86, 87 and the provisions of section 2 on the conser-
vation and management of living resources.
95. Article 56 provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such
as the production of energy from water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention
with regard to:
(i) the establishment of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in
the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights
and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provi-
sions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil
shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI.
Id. art. 56
96. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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Article 58, paragraph 1, incorporates the high seas freedoms "re-
ferred to in article 87"97 into the regime of the exclusive economic
zone with one major difference: article 58 contains its own list of
the high seas freedoms applicable in the economic zone, and that
list is not left completely open-ended by the words "inter alia."
While article 58 does not contain the article 87 references to the
freedoms of fishing, scientific research, and the construction of ar-
tificial islands and installations, it repeats the article 87 references
to the freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of subma-
rine cables and pipelines. Article 58 then adds a reference to
"other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these free-
doms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft
and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other
provisions of this Convention." ' In so far as warships are con-
cerned, this new clause is, in effect, the functional substitute for
the "inter alia" in article 87.
Many activities are traditionally carried out by warships at sea.
Are they covered by the words "navigation," "overflight," or the
"laying of submarine cables and pipelines"? To the extent that
they are not, it is difficult to imagine an activity of warships that is
not "related to these freedoms." The rights of the warship in this
regard must be analyzed in terms of its function. The warship is
not a merchantman transporting goods or persons from point to
point. Its primary mission is to remain and patrol the very "high-
ways" and "outlands" that the merchantman hopes to traverse as
quickly and expeditiously as possible, in part so as to keep those
areas safe for the merchantman. So long as there is no unlawful
use or threat of force and the warship acts with "due regard" for
the rights of the coastal State and other States to use the sea, the
subjective question of whether the warship is a welcome visitor is
outside the scope of legal inquiry.
To put the matter differently, warships in principle enjoy free-
dom to carry out their military missions under the regime of the
high seas subject to three basic obligations: (1) the duty to refrain
from the unlawful threat or use of force; (2) the duty to have "due
regard" to the rights of others to use the sea; and (3) the duty to
observe applicable obligations under other treaties or rules of in-
ternational law. The same requirements apply in the exclusive eco-
97. Convention, supra note 1, art. 58, para. 1. For the text of article 87, we supra note 46.
98. Convention, supra note 1, art. 58, para. 1.
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nomic zone, with the addition of an obligation to have "due regard
to the rights and duties of the coastal State" in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. 99
It is essentially a futile exercise to engage in speculation as to
whether naval maneuvers and exercises within the economic zone
are permissible. In principle, they are. States simply never agreed
to abandon such rights in all the semi-enclosed seas of the world,
including all those bordering Europe and Arabia, for example. The
relevant inquiry is whether the particular activity in a particular
place is consistent with the "due regard" obligation. For example,
it would be difficult to justify a weapons exercise that does signifi-
cant damage to a valuable natural resource being exploited by the
coastal State in the economic zone. On the other hand, a coastal
State's political or military interest in avoiding the presence of the
warship is not in itself reflected in its economic zone rights under
article 56,100 and accordingly is not an object of the "due regard"
obligation of the flag State.
The "high seas" nature of the rights and obligations enjoyed by
warships in the economic zone is strongly reinforced by the provi-
sions of article 58, paragraph 2.101 That paragraph incorporates all
of the substantive provisions of the high seas regime into the eco-
nomic zone regime except for the enumeration of freedoms in arti-
cle 87 (since article 58, paragraph 1, contains its own enumeration)
and provisions on fishing (since there is no freedom of fishing in
principle in the exclusive economic zone), unless those provisions
are incompatible with the economic zone provisions. In particular,
there would appear to be nothing in the rule regarding the com-
plete immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of any other
State, 102 the rule regarding the duty to render assistance, 03 the
99. Id. art. 58, para. 3. Because of a technical problem in the cross-reference provisions of
article 58, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the rule that the freedoms of the high seas shall
be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise
of the freedoms of the high seas, which appears in article 87, paragraph 2, is not expressly
incorporated into the economic zone regime by article 58, paragraph 2. Nevertheless, article
58, paragraph 1, uses the general term "the freedoms referred to in article 87." Id. art. 58,
para. 1. Since the cross-reference is to article 87 as a whole, it can, and obviously should, be
read as incorporating the basic restraint on the freedoms set forth in paragraph 2 of article
87.
100. For the text of article 56, see supra note 95.
101. For the text of article 58, see supra note 94.
102. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 95-96.
103. Id. art. 98.
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rule prohibiting the transport of slaves,"' or the rules regarding
the nationality and administration of ships,21 piracy,100 submarine
cables and pipelines,'10 7 narcotic drugs, 0 8 or the right of visit '
that are "incompatible" with the provisions of part V on the exclu-
sive economic zone.110 Hot pursuit lawfully commenced elsewhere
may proceed through the exclusive economic zone of a foreign
State until the territorial sea is reached.' 1
Under article 58, paragraph 3, while exercising their rights and
performing their duties in the exclusive economic zone, States are
required to comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal State in accordance with the provisions of the Convention
and compatible rules of international law.112 The textual antece-
dent of this provision is article 17 of the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.118 It refers to a situation
in which the right or freedom to conduct an activity is subject to
some regulation by the coastal State.
In the exclusive economic zone, this situation may arise in two
circumstances. First, and most importantly, the coastal State has
the right, with respect to ships exercising the freedom of naviga-
tion in the exclusive economic zone, to take certain measures to
enforce internationally approved regulations regarding the dis-
charge of pollutants in the exclusive economic zone as well as its
own regulations regarding the dumping of wastes in the zone.'
Second, pursuant to article 79, which applies in effect to all of
the seabed within the economic zone, the coastal State's duty not
to impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables and pipe-
104. Id. art. 99.
105. Id. arts. 91-94, subject to arts. 97; 220, para. 6.
106. Id. arts. 100-07.
107. Id. arts. 112-15.
108. Id. art. 108.
109. Id. art. 110.
110. Id. arts. 55-75.
111. Id. art. ill.
112. For the text of article 58, see supra note 94.
113. Article 17 provides:
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the
laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with these arti-
cles and other rules of international law and, in particular, with such law", and
regulations relating to transport and navigation.
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 4, art. 17.
114. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 210; 211, paras. 5-6; 216; and 220, pars. 3-7. In addi-
tion, in ice-covered areas, the coastal State may adopt and enforce its ovm lama and regula-
tions to prevent pollution from ships. Id. art. 234.
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lines on the continental shelf is "subject to its right to take reason-
able measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the ex-
ploitation of its natural resources, and the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution from pipelines."11 5 Moreover, the delinea-
tion of the course for laying pipelines on the seabed is subject to
coastal State consent.1 6
None of the foregoing provisions would appear to be generally
relevant to the activities of warships. Thus the "laws and regula-
tions" clause of article 58, paragraph 3, need not detain us further
for purposes of this study.
In principle, the right to authorize the conduct of an activity in
the economic zone is expressly attributed to:
115. Id. art. 79, para. 2. Article 79 provides in full:
1. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the conti-
nental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of this article.
2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the
continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not im-
pede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines.
3. The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the conti-
nental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.
4. Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to establish condi-
tions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea, or its jurisdic-
tion over cables and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the explo-
ration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its resources or the operations of
artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction.
5. When laying submarine cables or pipelines, States shall have due regard to
cables or pipelines already in position. In particular, possibilities of repairing
existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.
Id. art. 79.
116. Id. art. 79, para. 3. Some may argue that there is another category, namely the exer-
cise of reasonable regulatory authority to ensure that ships exercising the freedom of naviga-
tion do not engage in activities that require coastal State consent, particularly fishing. For
example, may the coastal State require fishing boats exercising freedom of navigation in the
economic zone to stow their gear in the same manner as fishing boats exercising the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea?
The basis for analysis of this question is not article 58, paragraph 3, of the Convention.
There is no general power to regulate navigation for the purpose of facilitating the enforce-
ment of coastal State rights over other activities.
The basis for analysis of this question is the right of the coastal State to enforce its exclu-
sive sovereign rights over exploitation of natural resources. It may be reasonable for the
coastal State, in exercising those powers, to indicate that the failure of fishing boats navigat-
ing in the zone to conform to standard and relatively simple gear stowage practices will give
rise to a presumption that further investigation for possible fishery violations is merited.
Moreover, it should be recalled that fishing vessels of States that desire to engage in fish-
ing in the economic zone of a particular coastal State may be subject to gear stowage and
other restrictions designed to facilitate enforcement of coastal State fishery regulations as a
condition of permission to fish in the zone.
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(a) the coastal State pursuant to article 56 and the ar-
ticles referred to therein;
(b) all States pursuant to article 58 and the articles re-
ferred to therein; or
(c) neither.
These categories are mutually exclusive. If it appears that an activ-
ity may be covered by both articles 56 and 58, then it is the task of
the lawyer to decide which is properly applicable. If, on the other
hand, it appears that an activity is not properly regarded as being
within the ambit of either article 56 or article 58, then the matter
is dealt with pursuant to the "residual rights" provision of article
59.117
It is not likely that the types of activities with which this essay is
concerned would be subject to the sovereign rights of the coastal
State with respect to exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources or with respect to other activities for the economic ex-
ploitation and exploration of the zone. Interference with the exer-
cise of those rights raises a question of the "due regard" obligation
of the flag State under article 58, not the regulatory rights of the
coastal State under article 56 (except in the specific instance of
installations to be discussed presently).
The remaining coastal State rights in the economic zone are to
be found not in article 56, but in the articles to which article 56,
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c), refer. As has already been noted, juris-
diction with respect to protection and preservation of marine envi-
ronment is not directly relevant to this inquiry. That leaves artifi-
cial islands, installations and structures as well as marine scientific
research.
It should be noted before proceeding that the coastal State has
the exclusive right to authorize and regulate "drilling" on the con-
tinental shelf "for all purposes" under article 81. Since the conti-
nental shelf as defined in article 76 itself embraces the seabed area
within 200 miles of the coast, the ensuing discussion applies only
to activities that do not involve "drilling."
5. Artificial Islands, Installations and Structures in the Eco-
nomic Zone
The first potential conflict arises between the freedoms and
117. For the text of article 59, see supra note 93.
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rights of all States under article 58115 and the exclusive rights of
the coastal State under article 60.119 There is a basic distinction of
course between objects engaged in navigation and overflight (the
ship and aircraft being paradigms) and "artificial islands, installa-
tions and structures." That distinction may on occasion pose some
nice questions, but it normally need not detain us for the purposes
of this inquiry.
We are also presented with a potential conflict between the free-
dom to lay "submarine cables and pipelines" in article 58 and the
jurisdiction of the coastal State over "installations and structures"
in article 60. In this instance, taking into account the interpretive
canon that the specific governs the general, it is reasonable to con-
clude that "submarine cables and pipelines" within the meaning of
article 58 are not "installations and structures" within the meaning
of article 60. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the
rights of the coastal State with respect to submarine cables and
pipelines are separately elaborated in article 79.120
The more serious issue arises with respect to the right of all
States under article 58 to enjoy "other internationally lawful uses
of the sea related to" the freedoms of navigation, overflight and
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. Unlike the enumer-
ated freedoms themselves, the right to engage in other activities
related to these freedoms relates to "uses . . .compatible with the
other provisions of this Convention." '121 To what extent does that
right include the deployment and use of objects that are not prop-
erly regarded either as engaged in navigation or overflight (for ex-
ample, maneuvering, being towed or free floating) or as submarine
cables and pipelines? With respect to such objects, two questions
are posed. First, are they "installations" or "structures" within the
meaning of article 60? Second, if they are, are they within the cate-
118. For the text of article 58, see supra note 94.
119. Article 60 provides, in part, as follows:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive
right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and
use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and
other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the
rights of the coastal State in the zone.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 60, para. 1.
120. For the text of article 79, see supra note 115.
121. Convention, supra note 1, art. 58, para. 1.
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gories of installations and structures covered by article 60,
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c)? If the answer to both of these questions
is in the affirmative, then acknowledging both the premise that the
specific governs the general and the compatibility requirement, it
is generally reasonable to conclude that the objects are governed
by article 60 and are subject to exclusive coastal State jurisdiction.
With respect to the first of these two questions, the category in-
cluding "artificial islands, installations and structures" suggests
substantial objects both in terms of their size and the duration of
their stationary deployment. Under article 60 itself, they are the
kinds of objects around which, in principle, a safety zone might be
established. These words should be contrasted, for example, with
the word "device" in article 19, paragraph 2(f), or the word "equip-
ment" in articles 258 to 262 on marine scientific research.an In this
regard, it is particularly notable that article 260 which deals with
safety zones around marine scientific research installations, an is-
sue similar to that dealt with in paragraph 5 of article 60,123 is the
sole article in the marine scientific research installations series to
refer only to "installations" and not to "equipment." Thus, for ex-
ample, a temporary buoy marker would seem to be more clearly
within the scope of article 58 than article 60.
With respect to the second question, it is clear that article 60,
paragraph 1(b), does not refer to the specific types of activities
with which this essay deals.1 2' Therefore, if an object is properly
regarded as an "installation" or "structure," it is subject to the ex-
clusive rights of the coastal State if it falls within paragraph 1(c) of
article 60. The issue is whether the installation or structure "may
interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the
zone."' 25 As indicated in the general rule of good faith set forth in
122. Of course, the use of even the smallest and most inconsequential object, even one
attached to a ship, may be prohibited if the activity itself (irrespective of the use of an
object in connection with that activity) is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal
State. Thus, for example, in general one may not fish without permission in the economic
zone of a foreign State, even from a rowboat using a piece of string.
Whether sailors on board a ship that is equipped neither for substantial fishing nor for
substantial stowage of fish may engage in incidental fishing to feed themselves while navi-
gating through the zone is a nice question. In the context of this study, the question is likely
to arise infrequently, and then in a setting in which general humanitarian principles and
ordinary good sense, rather than the jurisdictional principles of the law of the sea, are likely
to determine the outcome.
123. For the text of article 60, see supra note 119.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 128-38.
125. Convention, supra note 1, art. 60, para. 1(c).
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article 300,126 the question of interference is one to be resolved in
good faith in light of the particular circumstances. For example,
absent significant long-term damage to resources, one could not
properly regard installations and structures of which the coastal
State and its nationals are, for the time being, unaware, as inter-
fering with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the
zone during that time.127
6. Marine Scientific Research in the Economic Zone
Another potential conflict arises in determining whether an ac-
tivity related to the acquisition of information at sea constitutes an
internationally lawful use of the sea within the meaning of article
58, paragraph 1,121 or marine scientific research within the meaning
of part XIII.129
126. For the text of article 300, see supra note 37.
127. Article 60, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention was the result of a compromise between
those who favored the establishment of coastal State jurisdiction over installations and
structures only of an economic nature and those who favored coastal State jurisdiction over
all installations and structures. The compromise is based on the case of United States v.
Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the United States persuaded the court to enjoin
foreign nationals from constructing a gambling casino in an area where permanent damage
would be done to a coral reef, a living resource of the continental shelf.
128. Convention, supra note 1, art. 58, para. 1. For the text of article 58, see supra note
94.
129. Relevant provisions in part XIII follow.
Article 244 provides, in part
1. States and competent international organizations shall, in accordance with
this Convention, make available by publication and dissemination through ap-
propriate channels information on proposed major programmes and their objec-
tives as well as knowledge resulting from marine scientific research.
Id. art. 244.
Article 246 provides, in part-
1. Coastal States, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right to regu-
late, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their exclusive economic
zone and on their continental shelf in accordance with the relevant provisions of
this Convention.
2. Marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and on the conti-
nental shelf shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State.
3. Coastal States shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent for
marine scientific research projects by other States or competent international
organizations in their exclusive economic zone or on their continental shelf to be
carried out in accordance with this Convention exclusively for peaceful purposes
and in order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the
benefit of all mankind.
Id. art. 246, paras. 1-3.
Article 248 provides:
States and competent international organizations which intend to undertake
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Serious issues of classification arise in this connection only with
respect to efforts to obtain information about the natural marine
environment. Efforts to obtain intelligence about the activities of
marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental
shelf of a coastal State shall, not less than six months in advance of the expected
starting date of the marine scientific research project, provide that State with a
full description oft
(a) the nature and objectives of the project;
(b) the method and means to be used, including name, tonnage, type and class
of vessels and a description of scientific equipment;
(c) the precise geographical areas in which the project is to be conducted;
(d) the expected date of first appearance and final departure of the research
vessels, or deployment of the equipment and its removal, as appropriate;
(e) the name of the sponsoring institution, its director and the person in
charge of the project; and
(f) the extent to which it is considered that the coastal State should be able to
participate or to be represented in the project.
Id. art. 248.
Article 249 provides, in part:
1. States and competent international organizations when undertaking marine
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of a
coastal State shall comply with the following conditions:
(a) ensure the right of the coastal State, if it so desires, to participate or be
represented in the marine scientific research project, especially on board re-
search vessels and other craft or scientific research installations, when practica-
ble, without payment of any renumeration to the scientists of the coastal State
and without obligation to contribute towards the costs of the project;
(b) provide the coastal State, at its request, with preliminary reports, as soon
as practicable, and with the final results and conclusions after the completion of
the research;
(c) undertake to provide access for the coastal State, at its request, to all data
and samples derived from the marine scientific research project and likewise to
furnish it with data which may be copied and samples which may be divided
without detriment to their scientific value;
(d) if requested, provide the coastal State with an assessment of such data,
samples and research results or provide assistance in their assessment or
interpretation;
(e) ensure, subject to paragraph 2, that the research results are made interna-
tionally available through appropriate channels, as soon as practicable;
(f) inform the coastal State immediately of any major change in the research
programme;
(g) unless otherwise agreed, remove the scientific research installations or
equipment once the research is completed.
Id. art. 249, pare. 1.
Article 258 provides:
The deployment and use of any type of scientific research installations or
equipment in any area of the marine environment shall be subject to the same
conditions as are prescribed in this Convention for the conduct of marine scien-
tific research in any such area.
Id. art. 258.
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foreign governments, ships and nationals (as contrasted with their
environmental effects) are not normally marine scientific research.
While the Convention contains no definition of marine scientific
research, this conclusion is reinforced by article 243. That article
refers to "the effort of scientists in studying the essence of phe-
nomena and processes occuring in the marine environment and the
interrelation between them."' 30 Similarly, the basic consent provi-
sion of article 246, paragraph 3, refers to projects "to increase sci-
entific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all
of mankind." 113 Article 19, paragraph 2, distinguishes between re-
search activities and acts aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.132 Even
marine archaeology is dealt with separately.1 33
Collection of military intelligence regarding foreign activities at
sea, in brief, is a use related to the exercise and protection of the
freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines within the meaning of article 58, paragraph
1.1" It does not constitute marine scientific research within the
meaning of the Convention.
The significant question is whether all gathering of information
regarding the natural marine environment is marine scientific re-
search within the meaning of the relevant articles. The text of the
Convention itself makes clear that it is not. Exploration of natural
resources is consistently treated differently from marine scientific
research. 3 5 Hydrographic survey is referred to separately from,
and in addition to, marine scientific research.136 Article 204 deals
separately with monitoring the risks or effects of pollution.
130. Id. art. 243.
131. Id. art. 246, para. 3.
132. For the text of article 19, see infra note 151.
133. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 149, 303. Article 303 limits coastal State rights over
marine archaeology to the 24-mile contiguous zone.
134. On the basis of State practice, it would be difficult to maintain that mere observation
and listening are not "internationally lawful." If more than mere observation and listening
is involved, questions may arise regarding the obligation to have due regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of their freedoms and rights at sea, or even the obligation to
respect the territorial sovereignty of a foreign State on land. Such questions are beyond the
scope of this essay.
135. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 56, 77. See also the definition of the term "activi-
ties in the Area," id. art. 1, which largely determines the scope of the regulatory competence
of the International Seabed Authority, as contrasted with the article on marine scientific
research in the Area. Id. art. 143.
136. See id. arts. 19, para. 2(j); 21, para. 1(g); 40.
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Perhaps most dispositive of this question is the fact that the
elaborate disclosure requirements of articles 244, 248 and 249137
themselves make it abundantly clear that the marine scientific re-
search provisions cannot apply to secret activities, or activities in-
tended to generate information that is to be kept secret. If the ob-
ject of secrecy is commercial, the coastal State would normally be
justified in concluding that the activity in question is commercial
exploration subject to its complete discretionary control If, on the
other hand, the reason for the secrecy is military, then the activity
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State regarding
marine scientific research. There is no other basis for exercising
coastal State jurisdiction because there is no general competence of
the coastal State over military activities in the economic zone.
Since it may generally be assumed that the secret activities of na-
vies in gathering information regarding the natural marine envi-
ronment are closely related to the exercise and protection of the
freedom of navigation, those activities fall within the purview of
article 58, paragraph 1.
Needless to say, navies also conduct or sponsor a great deal of
oceanographic research intended for open publication that would
of course be covered by the marine scientific research articles and
the provisions regarding disclosure and consent.
7. Residual Rights in the Economic Zone
The previous discussion has dealt with general classes of activi-
ties (deployment of objects, gathering of information) that fall
within both article 56 and article 58, necessitating the establish-
ment of refined and principled lines of demarcation of sub-classes.
Article 59138 deals with the opposite situation, namely one in which
an activity does not appear to fall within either article 56 or article
58.
There is a significant danger of error in taking the function of
article 59 too literally. The principal attention of the maritime
powers in ensuring the continued unimpaired operation of their
warships in the economic zone was focused on article 58 rather
than article 59. Thus, while the text of article 59 appeared in close
to final form in the very first single negotiating text in 1975,11s it
137. For the texts of articles 244, 248, and 249, see supra note 129.
138. For the text of article 59, see supra note 93.
139. Informal Single Negotiating Text, supra note 32, pt. H, art. 47, para. 3, IV Official
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took two more years to reach agreement on a revised text of arti-
cles 56 and 58, the elimination of a geographic definition of the
high seas in article 86, and the inclusion of a new article 55 in a
manner satisfactory to the major maritime powers. 140
The issue addressed by article 59 is essentially one of principle.
Some "territorialist" coastal States maintained that the economic
zone should be a zone of coastal State jurisdiction, subject to spe-
cific enumerated rights for all States. Others, particularly the ma-
jor maritime powers, contended that the economic zone should be
part of the free high seas open to all, subject to specific enumer-
ated exclusive coastal State rights. Article 59 in effect opts for allo-
cation on the merits of the particular use, rather than on the basis
of conceptual status. As the opening of article 554 on the exclu-
sive economic zone provides, specificity of functional allocation of
rights is itself the essence of the exclusive economic zone.
Should the need arise, the principal intrinsic guide to the proper
application of article 59 is the general thrust of articles 56 and 58
themselves. The question posed would be whether the activity in-
volved is more akin to the type of activity dealt with in article 56
or in article 58. In this connection, one observes that article 56
generally deals with localized activities of actual or potential eco-
nomic significance, while article 58 generally deals with communi-
cations and military activities.
8. The Continental Shelf
The primary significance of the regime of the continental shelf
for purposes of this essay is that it applies to uses of the seabed
and subsoil of the continental margin where that margin extends
seaward of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Nevertheless it
should be noted that pursuant to article 81, all drilling on the con-
tinental shelf, both within and seaward of 200 miles, is subject to
coastal State authorization.
The full regime of the high seas is applicable seaward of the 200-
mile exclusive economic zone. As previously noted, that regime in-
cludes express and implied freedoms of the sea that involve use of
the seabed. As with the international seabed area, the question is
Record 159, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8 (1975).
140. See, e.g., Informal Composite Negotiating Text, VIII Official Record 1, U.N. Doc A/
CONF.62WP.10 (1977)(text incorporating revisions).
141. For the text of article 55, see supra note 93.
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whether there is anything in the regime of the continental shelf
which is inconsistent with those high seas freedoms. The answer in
this case is different.
While the exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal State over ex-
ploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continen-
tal shelf are not particularly relevant to the activities of warships,
the coastal State has other rights that do qualify the exercise of
high seas freedoms relevant to this inquiry. In particular, the
coastal State has essentially the same rights with respect to artifi-
cial islands, installations, structures and marine scientific research
on the continental shelf as it enjoys in the exclusive economic
zone.142 Thus, the questions of classification that arise in connec-
tion with installations and structures as well as marine scientific
research in the exclusive economic zone arise in similar form with
respect to the continental shelf.143 They are of somewhat less sig-
nificance for purposes of this essay because only uses of the seabed
are affected outside the exclusive economic zone.
III. WATERS SUBJECT TO COASTAL STATE SOVEREIGNTY
In conceptual terms, the distinguishing characteristic of waters
landward of the exclusive economic zone is that they are in princi-
ple subject to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State. In
functional terms, these waters may be divided into three
categories:
1.) areas where foreign ships do not enjoy a right of
passage;
2.) areas where foreign ships enjoy a right of passage
that may be suspended temporarily for security reasons
without discrimination amongst foreign ships; and
3.) areas where foreign ships enjoy a right of passage
that may not be suspended.
142. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 80, 246, 248, and 249. It also has some regulatory
powers over submarine pipelines, but not cables. Id. art. 79, para. 2.
143. While the coastal State may deny consent for marine scientific research on the conti-
nental shelf seaward of 200 miles only in specifically designated areas in which exploitation
or detailed exploration operations are occurring or will soon occur, that does not affect the
obligations to give notice to the coastal State of the project, provide for its participation,
and disseminate results. Id. art. 246, para. 6. Accordingly, the restrictions on the consent
requirement in areas beyond 200 miles are of no particular relevance to the conduct of mili-
tary activities of a secret nature.
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In the first category are the rivers, small bays, and other "clas-
sic" internal waters of the coastal State, as well as so-called "his-
toric bays." Except during an emergency, there is no right to enter
these waters without the consent of the coastal State.
In the second category are the territorial sea, waters which are
internal only by virtue of the establishment of a system of straight
baselines connecting coastal promontories or fringing islands im-
mediately off the coast, and archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State. However straits used for international navigation and
archipelagic sea lanes, irrespective of whether the waters are terri-
torial, archipelagic, or internal by virtue of the establishment of a
system of straight baselines, are in the third category.
It has already been observed that warships normally do more
than point-to-point navigation. From that perspective, the most
important characteristic of waters subject to coastal State sover-
eignty is that activities that are not incidental to passage between
one point and another point outside those waters require the con-
sent of the coastal State. To avoid the requirement of consent, pas-
sage must also be continuous and expeditious.'" Ships must re-
frain from any activity "not having a direct bearing on passage, 1"4
or from activities "other than those incident to their normal modes
of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by
force majeure or by distress."1114
This being said, it is important to note that these provisions do
not restrict the normal incidents of navigation. Ships do not nor-
mally travel in a straight line but take into account seabed topog-
raphy, currents, weather conditions, availability of navigational
aids, and other factors relevant to the safety of the ship and those
on board. The classic priority given to safety at sea by the law of
the sea is not only maintained by the new Convention, but aug-
mented by a new rule that passage includes stopping and anchor-
ing not only where incidental to ordinary navigation or rendered
necessary by force majeure or distress, but also "for the purpose of
rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or
distress.'
1 47
Not only natural factors, but man-made hazards as well, may re-
144. Id. arts. 18, para. 2; 38, para. 2; 53, para. 3.
145. Id. art. 19, para. 2(1).
146. Id. art. 39, para. 1(c) and subject to art. 54.
147. Id. art. 18, para. 2.
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quire deviation from straight-line navigation. These may run the
gamut from giving fairly wide berth to oil rigs to taking precau-
tions where geographic conditions permit against surprise attack
by an unknown and potentially hostile submarine.
1. Innocent Passage
"Innocent passage" is the classic right of passage enjoyed by all
States in the territorial sea. The 1958 Convention extended the re-
gime of innocent passage to waters which are internal only by vir-
tue of the establishment of a system of straight baselines.24 8 The
1982 Convention further extended that regime to archipelagic wa-
ters outside archipelagic sealanes.149 The 1982 Convention however
applies the regime of "transit passage" rather than innocent pas-
sage to most straits used for international navigation. 0
In so far as warships are concerned, the most salient characteris-
tics of the innocent passage regime are as follows:
- submarines must navigate on the surface;
- there is no right of overflight;
- the coastal State has the right to prevent passage that
is not innocent;
- the meaning of innocence is subject to different inter-
pretations; in particular, there has traditionally been dis-
agreement as to whether innocence is to be measured
solely by a ship's conduct while in the territorial sea of
the coastal State (an objective standard), or also by its
flag or mission (a subjective standard);
- the coastal State has certain rights to regulate inno-
cent passage;
- except in straits used for international navigation, in-
nocent passage may be temporarily suspended in specific
areas without discrimination amongst foreign ships;
- there has traditionally been a substantial difference of
opinion, even among some maritime powers, as to
whether the innocent passage of warships may be subject
148. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
149. Convention, supra note 1, art. 52.
150. Id. art. 38.
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to a requirement of prior notification to or authorization
by the coastal State;
- charges may be levied upon a foreign ship as payment
for specific services rendered to the ship.
The 1982 Convention changes this situation in two important re-
spects. First, it adds more detail to the regime of innocent passage.
Second, in straits and archipelagic sealanes, instead of the regime
of innocent passage, it applies a more liberal passage regime.
In so far as innocent passage is concerned, the most important
clarifications concern the meaning of innocence and the scope of
coastal State regulatory powers. The relevant provisions are article
19,151 defining innocent passage; article 21,152 providing the param-
151. Article 19 provides:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity
with this Convention and with other rules of international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in
any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or
security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal
State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any
other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Id. art. 19. (Text substantially copied from the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention is
italicized.)
152. Article 21, in part, provides:
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the
following.
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
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eters of coastal State laws or regulations governing innocent pas-
sage; article 24,153 defining the duties of the coastal State; and arti-
cle 30,1" allowing an exception for warships.
The new provisions of article 19, paragraph 2, and article 24,
paragraph 1(b), are decidedly influenced by an objective, rather
than subjective, test for innocence. The chapeau of article 19, para-
graph 2, is of particular interest in this regard, since the test for
innocence is linked to activities while in the territorial sea, rather
than passage itself.
155
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or
installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the
coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the preven-
tion, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sani-
tary laws and regulations of the coastal State.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, man-
ning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally ac-
cepted international rules or standards.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally ac-
cepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.
Id. art. 21. (Text substantially copied from the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention is
italicized.)
153. Article 24 provides:
1. The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships
through the territorial sea except in accordance with this Convention. In partic-
ular, in the application of this Convention or of any laws or regulations adopted
in conformity with this Convention, the coastal State shall not:
(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or
Cb) discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against
ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State.
Id. art. 24. (Text substantially copied from the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention is
italicized.)
154. Article 30 provides:
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any re-
quest for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may re-
quire it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Id. art. 30. (Text substantially copied from the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention is
italicized.)
155. One finds a certain irony in the fact that while British and Israeli personnel lost
their lives in battle against a subjective interpretation of innocent pamge and both govern-
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The regulatory rights of the coastal State are elaborated with
greater specificity in article 21 and, more importantly, are subject
to new specific limitations in article 21, paragraph 2, and article 24,
paragraph 1, elaborate "safeguards" on the exercise of anti-pollu-
tion enforcement powers,156 and the exclusion of warships from ap-
plication of pollution regulations.
1 7
The debate over whether the innocent passage of warships may
be subject to a requirement of prior notification to or authorization
by the coastal State was vigorously pursued at the Third U.N.
Conference. 5 8 Those who supported such requirements were un-
successful in obtaining general support for their position, and ac-
quiesced in the plea of the president of the Conference not to force
the matter to a vote. The president announced that these delega-
tions "would, however, like to reaffirm that their decision is with-
out prejudice to the rights of coastal States to adopt measures to
safeguard their security interests, in accordance with article 19 and
25 of the convention.
'159
In the earlier discussion of the general prohibition in article 301
on the threat or use of force contrary to the U.N. Charter, the au-
thor concluded that no responses to such a threat or use of force
were authorized other than those provided for in the Charter itself
(i.e., self-defense and Security Council measures), but noted that
the statement must be qualified in the case of innocent passage.100
Article 19 specifically excludes such a threat or use of force from
the definition of innocence; article 25 expressly provides that a
coastal State "may take the necessary measures in its territorial
ments finally won their point in the Convention, both refuse to give the Convention the
necessary support to ensure a legal victory.
156. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 223-32. See also infra note 163.
157. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 236.
158. It was not proposed that such requirements would apply in straits or archipelagic sea
lanes.
159. U.N. Doe. AICONF.62/SR.176 (1982). The statement of the Conference President
was specifically crafted to be unobjectionable to all, since articles 19 and 25 place the secur-
ity interest of the coastal State in a carefully limited context. During the Conference's clos-
ing session in Jamaica (December, 1982), however, some supporters of notification or au-
thorization requirements made references to the President's statement to reinforce their
position. It might be noted that the Conference President, Ambassador T.T.B. Koh of Sin-
gapore, has publically adopted a quite different position.
Ambassador Koh stated, "I think the Convention is quite clear on this point. Warships
do, like other ships, have a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, and there is
no need for warships to acquire the prior consent or even notification of the coastal State."
Address by Ambassador Koh, Duke Symposium on the Law of the Sea (Oct. 30, 1982).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
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sea to prevent passage which is not innocent,"""' and article 30
provides that the coastal State may require a warship to leave the
territorial sea for failure to comply with applicable regulations. As
previously noted, however, article 19 clearly moves in the direction
of an objective test for the determination of 'innocence" in terms
of specific conduct during passage, not in terms of the class or sub-
class of ship exercising the right of innocent passage.102 In any
event no such powers, however delimited, are given the coastal
State in connection with transit passage of straits, archipelagic sea-
lanes passage, or freedom of navigation and overflight in the eco-
nomic zone.
2. Transit Passage
By articulating a specific regime of transit passage for straits
used for international navigation between the high seas or exclu-
sive economic zones, the Convention renders both the rules and
the uncertainties of the earlier innocent passage regime irrelevant
in such straits.6 5
161. Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
162. See supra text accompanying note 155.
163. The salient provisions of the Convention in this regard follow.
Article 37 provides:
This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation be-
tween one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 37.
Article 38 provides, in part:
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of
transit passage, which shall not be impeded ....
2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this part of the free-
dom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expe-
ditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Id. art. 38, paras. 1-2.
Article 39 provides, in part:
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shalh
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Char-
ter of the United Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal mode3
of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force
majeure or by distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part.
2. Ships in transit passage shalh
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As compared with the characteristics of the innocent passage re-
(a) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
practices for safety at sea, including the International Regulations for Prevent-
ing Collisions at Sea;
(b) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.
Id. art. 39, paras. 1-2.
Article 41 provides, in part:
1. In conformity with this part, States bordering straits may designate sea
lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for navigation in straits where
necessary to promote the safe passage of ships.
2. Before designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting
traffic separation schemes, States bordering straits shall refer proposals to the
competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The organi-
zation may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be
agreed with the States bordering the straits, after which the States may desig-
nate, prescribe or substitute them.
Id. art. 41, paras. 1-2.
Article 42 provides, in part-
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt
laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of all
or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as provided
in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to ap-
plicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and
other noxious substances in the strait;
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the
stowage of fishing gear;
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in contra-
vention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of
States bordering straits.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact among
foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying, hamper-
ing or impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this section.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply with such
laws and regulations.
5. The flag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft entitled to
sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and regula-
tions or other provisions of this Part shall bear international responsibility for
any loss or damage which results to States bordering straits.
Id. art. 42, paras. 1-2, 4-5.
Article 44 provides, in part-
States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage .... There shall be
no suspension of transit passage.
Id. art. 44.
Article 233 provides, in part:
However, if a foreign ship other than those referred to in section 10 has com-
mitted a violation of the laws and regulations referred to in article 42, paragraph
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gime set forth earlier, the salient characteristics of the transit pas-
sage regime are as follows:
- there is no requirement that submarines navigate on
the surface;
- since the right of transit passage also applies to over-
flight, airborne escort is lawful;
- the coastal State does not have the right to prevent
passage that is not innocent; in particular, the prohibi-
tion on the threat or use of force is set forth as an obliga-
tion of the flag State, not a right of the coastal State;
-the question of "innocence" in connection with war-
ships does not arise;
- the coastal State has no unilateral regulatory powers
relevant to warships; in particular, pollution regulations
do not apply, traffic regulations must be approved by the
competent international organization, and the express
remedy for violation of coastal State regulations by a
warship is not the power to take measures to prevent
passage that is not innocent or to require the warship to
leave the territorial sea, but rather a diplomatic claim
against the flag State;
- transit passage may not be suspended;
- there were neither proposals nor suggestions that any
requirement of prior notification or authorization for
warships would be applicable to transit passage, even by
those who argued that such requirements be applied to
innocent passage;
- the cost of navigation and safety aids and special anti-
pollution measures should be borne through cooperative
agreements between user States and States bordering
1(a) and (b), causing or threatening major damage to the marine environment of
the straits, the States bordering the straits may take appropriate enforcement
measures and if so shall respect mutatis mutandis the provisions of this section.
Id. art. 233.
For the relevant provision of section 10 (art. 236), see supra text accompanying note 32.
Section 7 of the Convention, entitled "Safeguards," contains restraints on the exercise of
pollution enforcement powers designed to protect ship and cargo owners, crewa, and produc-
ers and consumers.
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straits; no reference is made to charges for specific ser-
vices rendered to the ship.
16 '
It should be noted that the regime of non-suspendable innocent
passage, rather than transit passage, applies in two categories of
straits used for international navigation under the 1982
Convention: e"
- straits formed by an island and the mainland of the
same State, if there is a route through the economic zone
or high seas seaward of the island that is of similar con-
venience with respect to navigational and hydrographical
characteristics; and
- straits used for international navigation between a
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and
the territorial sea of a foreign State (rather than another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone).
In addition, special long-standing treaty regimes for particular
straits (such as the Turkish straits), rights under the peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel,""6 and artificial canals are unaffected by
the Convention. 7
3. Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
Reversing a contrary decision in 1958,16e the new Convention
164. This omission is arguably without prejudice to the rare case in which liability arises
under general principles of law regarding negotiorum gestio or unjust enrichment.
165. Convention, supra note 1, art. 45.
166. The Egyptian instrument of ratification of the Convention was accompanied by the
follow'ing declaration:
The provisions of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel concerning
passage through the Strait of Titan and the Gulf of Aqaba come within the
framework of the general regime of waters forming straits referred to in part III
of the Convention, wherein it is stipulated that the general regime shall not af-
fect the legal status of waters forming straits and shall include certain obliga-
tions with regard to security and the maintenance of order in the State border-
ing the strait.
Declarations made upon ratification of the Convention (Egypt), 3 Law of the Sea Bull. 13,
14 (1984).
167. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 35, 311.
168. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 16, U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 270, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1; Certain Legal aspects Concerning the
Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, Evensen, Prep. Doc. No. 15, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.13/18, I Official Records, United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
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permits an independent island nation to enclose its archipelago
with archipelagic baselines of up to 100 (or in a few cases, 125)
nautical miles in length, provided that the ratio of water to land in
the area thus enclosed is between 1:1 and 9:1.269 The territorial sea,
contiguous zone, economic zone, and continental shelf of such a
State are measured seaward of the archipelagic baselines.170Within
the archipelagic baselines, a new regime of archipelagic waters ap-
plies.171 Archipelagic waters, including their airspace and seabed
and subsoil, are subject to the sovereignty of the archipelagic
State. 7 2 There are two regimes of passage applicable within
archipelagic waters.
The regime of innocent passage is generally applicable through-
out archipelagic waters in the same manner as in the territorial sea
or internal waters enclosed by a system of straight baselines.1 3
Since the regime of straits into and within the archipelago is sub-
sumed within the broader regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage,
the right of innocent passage outside such lanes may be suspended
temporarily in archipelagic waters for security reasons, as in the
territorial sea outside straits.'
The more liberal regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, rather
than mere innocent passage, is applicable in archipelagic sea lanes.
All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes pas-
sage, which may not be suspended. If the archipelagic State does
not designate sea lanes or air routes, that right may be exercised
through the routes normally used for international navigation."'
289, 298 [hereinafter cited as Official Records UNCLOS I], reprinted in U.N. Doe. A/
CONF.13/37 (1958); Proposal by the Phillipines, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L93, HI Official
Records UNCLOS 1 239, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/39 (1958); Comment by Gov-
ernment of Cuba, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/5 (1958) and Add.1 to 4, I Official Records UN-
CLOS I, 79, 80, reprinted in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/37 (1958); Nineteenth Plenary Meeting
U.N. CONF. L.O.S., Consideration of the report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.13/SR.19, H Official Records UNCLOS 1 61, 63, reprinted in U.N. Doe. A/CONF.13/
38 (1958); Forty-eighth Meeting of the first Committee of the U.N. Conf. LOS., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.13.C.1/SR.48, HI Official Records UNCLOS I 146, 148, reprinted in U.N. Doe. A/
CONF.13/39 at 148 (1958).
169. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 46, 47.
170. Id. art. 48.
171. Id. art. 49. However, internal waters of individual islands, such as rivers and bay,
retain their status as such. Id. art. 50.
172. Id. art. 49.
173. Id. art. 52. This does not apply in internal waters such as rivera or baya of an indi-
vidual island. Id. art. 50.
174. Id. art. 52.
175. Article 53 defines archipelagic sea lanes passage as follows:
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The rules governing the duties of the flag State and the rights of
the archipelagic State with respect to the conduct of archipelagic
sea lanes passage176 are identical to those set forth with respect to
transit passage of straits used for international navigation.
1
7
Archipelagic sea lanes, and air routes above them, are designated
by the archipelagic State after its proposals have been adopted by
the competent international organization. They traverse the
archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial sea and must include
all normal passage routes used as routes for international naviga-
tion or overflight.
17 8
The lanes are designated by axes traversing the archipelago.
Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage may not devi-
ate more than twenty-five nautical miles to either side of the axes
and, within that area, may not navigate closer to the coasts of is-
lands bordering the sea lane than ten percent of the distance be-
tween such islands.79
These broad sea lanes were designed, inter alia, with a view to
Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Con-
vention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for
the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone or another part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Id. art. 53, para. 3.
176. Id. art. 54.
177. See id. arts. 37-44.
The virtual identity of wording used in connection with the regimes of 'transit
passage' of straits (drafted first) and 'archipelagic sealanes passage' invites at-
tention to the differences. The term 'rights of navigation and overflight in nor-
mal mode' is used in defining archipelagic sealanes passage, whereas the term
'freedom of navigation and overflight' is used in defining transit passage of
straits. Many were prepared to use either term in connection with archipelagos.
The comment was made that the underlying concept of unimpeded passage
through, over, and under the waters would be the same. It would normally be
applied in the same way, but certain practical considerations in the application
of the concept might be sufficiently different, owing to the narrowness of straits
as contrasted with the broad expanses of archipelagic waters, that one should
not automatically tie oneself to identical application in all cases. It was also
noted that, since the delimitation of the area to which archipelagic sealanes pas-
sage applies is dictated by practical considerations and is subject to change, it
would be inappropriate to use the term 'freedom.' Read in the context of the two
chapters, the difference in wording, if it produces problems at all, seems most
likely to produce them for scholars.
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1977 New York
Session, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 57, 66 (1978).
178. Convention, supra note 1, art. 53.
179. Id. art. 53, para. 5.
REGIME OF WARSHIPS
accomodating the needs of warships and military task forces trav-
ersing such extended and exposed routes to employ evasive tactics
and to disperse a broad defensive screen of ships, helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft around the heart of the task force. Both the
transiting State and the archipelagic State have an interest in
avoiding the creation of a tempting target.
IV. CONCLUSION
If there is anything at all surprising about this analysis, it is that
there is nothing surprisingly new in the regime of warships under
the 1982 Convention. Based on the early debates in the U.N. Sea-
bed Committee in preparation for the Conference, this result was
by no means "a foregone conclusion," to use the words of Shake-
speare. There were widespread calls for a global organization with
comprehensive powers over all ocean uses, pressures for the decla-
ration of zones of peace, demands for seabed demilitarization and
restrictions on submarines, nuclear power, and nuclear weapons,
and bold assertions (paraphrasing Shakespeare) that we came to
bury Grotius, not to praise him.
In addition, if one considers the revolutionary nature of the
changes in the jurisdictional map of the sea pursuant to the Con-
vention, one would expect to find some dramatic changes in the
rules governing warships. The extension of coastal State sover-
eignty over broad expanses of archipelagic waters and a twelve-
mile territorial sea, the creation of a huge economic zone of 200
nautical miles embracing all the marginal seas of the world, the
extension of sovereign rights over the seabed at least to that dis-
tance and to the edge of the continental margin beyond, the crea-
tion of new environmental duties and coastal State environmental
jurisdiction, and the formation of an international organization to
control, as drafted, "all activities" in the remaining area of the sea-
bed could have had monumental impact on the regime of warships.
The demilitarization pressures were deflected by liberal use of
"peaceful purposes" clauses and cross-references to the prohibi-
tions on the threat or use of force in the U.N. Charter that have
little, if any, effect on the legal regime. With respect to all the new
regimes or geographical expansions of existing regimes, effects on
activities of warships are expressly eliminated or mitigated in each
case:
- there is a liberal right of archipelagic sea lanes passage
in broad sealanes traversing the newly recognized
1984]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
archipelagic waters;
- the regime of innocent passage in the expanded terri-
torial sea is made more objective and is replaced by a
more liberal regime of transit passage in straits;
- high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other inter-
nationally lawful uses of the sea related to those free-
doms, are expressly preserved in the economic zone;
- high seas freedoms are given more explicit protection
from infringement by the coastal State in its exercise of
continental shelf rights;180
- warships are excluded from all environmental
provisions;
- regulation of the deep seabeds depends on a definition
of the term "activities in the Area" that does not cover
military activities or marine scientific research.
It will come as no surprise to anyone that the United States was
not the only, but certainly the most active, delegation in promoting
this result. The irony is that a U.S. administration strongly com-
mitted to the expansion of the global military capability of the
United States, including its capacity to project naval power, de-
clined to accept the Convention when it was completed in 1982
because of its deep seabed mining provisions. This raises a more
profound question regarding the future of the regime of warships.
Lying behind the learned and conflicting arguments about the con-
tent of the future customary international law of the sea are as-
sumptions about priorities: the will to act in a situation in which
law is made, and unmade, by acquiescence. It was the strong prior-
ity accorded economic over political or military considerations that
influenced the rest of the world to concede to the major powers
most of what the latter desired on military issues at the Law of the
Sea Conference. In broad terms, the same reasoning could apply to
the reshaping of "customary law" in the coming years.
The question is whether the major powers in general, and the
United States and Western Europe in particular, are themselves
180. Id. art. 78, para. 2. The prohibition on infringement, in addition to unjustifiable in-
terference, and the open-ended reference to navigation and "other rights and freedoms of
other States" are new to the 1982 Convention.
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beginning to lower the priority they accord naval considerations
(particularly the facilitation of global naval mobility and opera-
tions) as against economic, environmental, and perhaps even alter-
native defense considerations in shaping their ocean policies.
If we are witnessing such a change in priorities--dramatized by
the U.S., British, and West German decisions not to sign the Con-
vention-then we must expect corresponding changes in the law
over time. Ignoring the U.N. and multilateral conferences will not
make the pressures for restrictive change disappear, because those
institutions are not the only-or even the major-source. 81 The
pressures are formed in the combination of fear, xenophobia, and
the desire for relative advantage that confronts a warship every
time it wanders into a foreign region. The "law" at any given time
is a balance struck between those pressures and the counter-pres-
sures of the major naval powers on behalf of their fleets. The
counter-pressures must be applied on all fronts, political and eco-
nomic as well as military. If the priorities of the major naval pow-
ers shift, so will their relative counter-pressures.
Even if restrictive changes in the law are to occur, we are less
likely to notice them in the short run. Those who are closest to the
decisions that may in the end produce new restrictions on warships
will be the most sensitive to demonstrating clearly that they took
no such risk. Thus, in the near term, strong "counter-pressures" on
warship issues are likely to characterize the rhetoric, and some ac-
tions, of the United States and a few of its maritime allies. The
risk will grow as the temporal and political distance increases be-
tween those responsible for the decision not to sign the Convention
and those who must decide day-to-day issues of priority. If that
growing risk is not perceived and dealt with at that stage, the
"law" is certain to change (unless the Soviets can contain it, which
is doubtful). If future governments do perceive the problem and
are able to act effectively to resolve it, then we may see little
change, if any.
181. Indeed, the Convention text is evidence of the contrary. Its treatment of arship3 is
substantially more liberal than that found in the legislation of many coastal States, includ-
ing some maritime powers.
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